The recent detection of hantavirus cases on a cruise ship arriving from Argentina has once again activated international health coordination mechanisms among several countries and the World Health Organization (WHO). Health authorities have reiterated that, based on current evidence, the risk of person-to-person transmission remains limited for this type of virus.
Situations such as this highlight the need to maintain sustained international cooperation to prevent and respond to potential health emergencies, particularly in a context shaped by the climate crisis, biodiversity loss, global mobility, inequalities between health systems, and insufficient investment in tools to prevent and respond to these threats.
Hantaviruses are a family of viruses primarily transmitted by rodents that can cause severe disease. Although person-to-person transmission is extremely rare and has only been documented in certain variants, there are currently no internationally approved vaccines or specific antiviral treatments for these infections.
This episode, which has received significant media attention in recent days, also provides an opportunity to look beyond the specific case and revisit questions that already emerged during previous health emergencies: who finances the development of medical countermeasures, who manufactures them, and who can actually access them. Investment in research and development (R&D) for emerging infectious diseases often follows cycles of “panic and neglect”. Resources increase during emergencies and decline once political and media attention fades, preventing the development of products before the next health crisis emerges.
According to publicly available sources, between 2015 and 2024 global investment in R&D for new treatments, vaccines, and diagnostics for this class of viruses — the Bunyaviricetes (including hantaviruses, Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus, and Rift Valley fever virus) — amounted to only USD 33.4 million per year. Sixty percent of this funding came from the United States National Institutes of Health (NIH), while 17% was provided by the European Commission. Even so, these figures may underestimate the real level of investment.
There is currently evidence of 14 products under development for Hantaan virus, including seven vaccines, four diagnostics, two medicines, and one biological product. None has yet reached international clinical trial phases, although some candidates have been used in adults in China. Most of these developments are concentrated in that country (with one exception) and are being driven primarily by universities and military hospitals.
Research and manufacturing capacity for vaccines, therapeutics, and other health technologies targeting diseases with epidemic potential remain heavily concentrated in a limited number of Western countries, particularly the United States. However, countries such as China are progressively increasing their role in global pharmaceutical innovation. This shift in capabilities also raises questions about how access to future health innovations will be managed.
All of these debates remain central to the development of the Pandemic Agreement being negotiated under the framework of the World Health Organization. Although WHO Member States reached a political agreement on the treaty in 2025, negotiations on the system intended to regulate pathogen access and benefit-sharing (PABS) remain ongoing, and the deadline has once again been extended until next year. The main challenge continues to be how to ensure that the sharing of genetic sequence data and biological materials is accompanied by binding legal obligations guaranteeing equitable access to vaccines, diagnostics, and therapeutics.
At Salud por Derecho, we believe that sharing scientific information and biological materials must also translate into shared benefits. Recent hantavirus cases once again illustrate the difficulties involved in building international legal frameworks capable of regulating this issue effectively. Public funding allocated to research can play an important role in this process if it incorporates conditions related to transparency, accessibility, technology transfer, and affordable pricing aligned with the public interest.
The COVID-19 pandemic also made clear the extent to which dependence on a very limited number of countries for the manufacturing of vaccines and other health technologies can become problematic. When production is concentrated in only a few locations, access during a global emergency can become far more unequal. Strengthening regional manufacturing capacities and facilitating technology transfer would help build a more balanced international response that is less dependent on a small number of actors.
Preparedness for future pandemics does not depend solely on the development of new vaccines or treatments. It also requires international agreements capable of ensuring that these advances reach all countries fairly and equitably. Episodes such as the recent hantavirus cases once again underscore the importance of strengthening international cooperation, transparency, and collective response capacities in the face of future health emergencies.
The data used for this piece comes from Impact Global Health. Data on R&D investments used captures IGH’s data on Bunyaviricetes, and might not reflect the totality of R&D investments in this área. Data on R&D candidates captures IGH’s data on Hantaan virus, and might not reflect all the candidates developed for all Hantavirus.
