Less than two months before the negotiations on the Pandemic Treaty conclude at the World Health Organization, some proposals remain the subject of intense debate and negotiation — particularly those related to technology transfer (Article 11) and the access and benefit-sharing system (PABS, Article 12).
The European Union has opposed some of these proposals, advocating for voluntary measures for industry to share technology and knowledge during emergencies, and rejecting measures that include binding commitments to rapidly access knowledge and expand access to technology for manufacturing pharmaceutical products in emergencies.
In this analysis, we explain how this stance is inconsistent with other positions and commitments previously taken by the EU — where it has supported binding measures — and how it also fails to reflect the level of public resources invested and the role played by EU Member States in pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) for pandemics. We argue that the EU could actually benefit from a mechanism that includes binding measures for technology transfer and the equitable distribution of pharmaceutical products in future pandemics.
Europe already supports similar non-voluntary principles in other forums
The question of whether measures to promote technology transfer during a pandemic should be voluntary or binding has been a point of tension in the negotiations. Relying exclusively on voluntary measures has proven ineffective in responding to COVID-19, as illustrated by the lack of contributions to mechanisms such as C-TAP. The rapid expansion of manufacturing capacity through technology and knowledge transfer during an emergency is necessary to protect global health and requires a combination of binding and voluntary measures, as outlined in a report by the Global Health Centre.
The absence of agile mechanisms to scale up vaccine manufacturing capacity results in loss of life and unnecessarily increased healthcare costs. Some binding measures to protect public health — such as compulsory licenses — are recognized under international law, including the TRIPS Agreement, and have been used by countries across all income levels to facilitate access to medicines (see map below), including EU Member States. For example, Germany and Hungary made legislative changes to speed up the process for issuing compulsory licenses during COVID-19.
The EU is well aware of the need for binding measures in emergency situations. In fact, while in Geneva the EU denies the need for binding measures to accelerate technology and knowledge transfer during emergencies, in Brussels it is negotiating precisely the opposite: the obligation to share trade secrets for the effective implementation of compulsory licenses within the EU.
Europe is not leading investment in R&D for pathogens with pandemic potential
The EU’s position is difficult to justify when looking at who the main funders and recipients of research and development (R&D) funding are for pharmaceutical products targeting diseases and pathogens with pandemic potential.
The latest G-FINDER data shows that the EU and its Member States were collectively the second-largest funder of R&D between 2014 and 2023. However, their funding amounted to only 25% of the level of investment made by the United States and was heavily concentrated in one country — Germany — which accounted for 57.16% of all European funding, followed by EU-level funds, which represented 24.28%.
Europe is also not the main recipient of this funding: the EU and its Member States received less investment than the global annual average, with the exception of Germany in 2020, 2021, and 2023, and France in 2023.
Figure 1. Main R&D Funders for WHO Priority Pathogens 
Figure 2. Main Recipient Countries of R&D Funding for WHO Priority Pathogens
As a practical example, Europe was not among the leading regions in vaccine development during COVID-19. According to UNICEF data, of the 27 vaccines that received at least one regulatory approval, only one — the Spanish HIPRA vaccine — was fully developed within the EU. Three vaccines were co-developed with companies from third countries (Comirnaty by Pfizer and BioNTech; VidPrevtyn by Sanofi and GSK; and VLA-2001 by Valneva and Dynavax), and one more (Janssen, based in Belgium) was developed by a company whose parent corporation is headquartered outside the EU.
Only one European vaccine — Comirnaty, partially developed by the German company BioNTech — ranked among the most widely distributed vaccines during the pandemic (i.e., those with regulatory approval and commercialization in more than one country).
3. Equitable distribution would not have a disproportionate negative impact on the European population, but would have a significant positive impact on global health
Our simulation shows that with a system redistributing 20% of the doses produced, low-income countries could have vaccinated their entire population with one dose within 19 months. It’s important to remember that these countries only secured enough doses to vaccinate 60% of their population with one dose.
For lower-middle-income countries, this redistribution would have allowed them to reach two doses per capita within two years — a goal that was never achieved during the actual period analyzed.
High-income countries, on the other hand, would have experienced only a one-month delay in reaching full coverage for a first dose, and a four-month delay for full coverage with two doses. This delay could likely have been offset through a staggered vaccination strategy that prioritized the most vulnerable populations.
To achieve one-dose coverage in all countries within a similar timeframe (10–12 months), a redistribution of 35% of monthly doses would have been necessary.
4. Conclusion
The protection of the right to health is a responsibility of States — both within and beyond their borders — and should be one of the guiding principles in the negotiations of the Pandemic Treaty. The EU’s opposition to accepting binding measures to improve equitable access to technology, knowledge, and pharmaceutical products in future pandemics is detrimental to both European and global health and security.
The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the growing decentralization and regionalization of global pharmaceutical innovation. Europe was not among the main innovation hubs during the pandemic. While it is collectively one of the largest funders and recipients of R&D funding, much of this investment is highly concentrated in one country: the United States.
The European Union now faces a choice: to maintain the status quo — which protects the interests of the pharmaceutical industry, perpetuates health inequities, and weakens international health cooperation — or to adopt measures that enhance human security and global health during emergencies by promoting access to knowledge and technology, including within Europe itself.
Main photo: WHO
